Pearson v. Tanner by unknown
2013 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
2-5-2013 
Pearson v. Tanner 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2013 
Recommended Citation 
"Pearson v. Tanner" (2013). 2013 Decisions. 1248. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2013/1248 
This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 2013 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
____________ 
 
No. 12-2503 
_____________ 
 
JEFFRY S. PEARSON;  
ALLEN L. FEINGOLD,  
                                   Appellants 
 
v. 
 
MARK W. TANNER; THERESA ALLEN; JERRY ALLEN, H/W;  
FELDMAN, SHEPHERD, WOHGELHERTNER, TANNER, WEINSTOCK & DODIG, 
LLP 
_____________ 
 
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA 
 (D.C. Civil No. 12-cv-00798) 
District Judge:  Honorable Gene E.K. Pratter  
____________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
January 17, 2013 
____________ 
 
Before: SMITH, CHAGARES and BARRY, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion Filed:   February 5, 2013) 
____________ 
 
OPINION 
____________ 
 
BARRY, Circuit Judge 
Suspended attorney Jeffrey Pearson and disbarred attorney Allen Feingold 
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(“Plaintiffs”) appeal from a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal of their declaratory judgment action 
against their former clients, Theresa and Jerry Allen; the Allens’ current lawyer, Mark 
Tanner; and Mr. Tanner’s firm, Feldman, Shepherd, Wohgelhertner, Tanner, Weinstock 
& Dodig, LLP.  Plaintiffs seek a declaration that they are entitled to recover, in quantum 
meruit, the reasonable value of legal services provided to the Allens before Plaintiffs’ 
suspension and disbarment.  We will affirm.    
I.  Background1
 In 2003, Mr. Feingold entered a contingency-fee contract to represent the Allens in 
a medical malpractice case.  In 2007, he “associated with and transferred responsibility” 
for the Allens’ litigation and the contingency-fee arrangement to Mr. Pearson.  Mr. 
Pearson represented the Allens until June of 2009, at which point he “associated with and 
transferred responsibility” to Theodore Schwartz, Esquire.  Then, in October of 2009, the 
Allens discharged Mr. Schwartz and retained Mr. Tanner and his law firm to continue 
prosecuting their medical malpractice claim.  
 
 After Mr. Tanner rebuffed requests to protect Plaintiffs’ claims against any 
recovery the Allens might ultimately obtain, Plaintiffs filed a declaratory judgment action 
seeking a declaration that they are entitled to recover the reasonable value of attorneys’ 
fees in quantum meruit in connection with their former legal representation of the Allens.  
Defendants moved to dismiss and submitted copies of public records establishing that Mr. 
                                                 
1 The facts are taken from the complaint with the exception of facts relating to Mssrs. 
Pearson and Feingold’s disciplinary histories, which are taken from public records 
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Feingold was suspended from the practice of law on March 30, 2006, and disbarred on 
August 22, 2008, and that Mr. Pearson was suspended for four months effective May 28, 
2009, and later for twenty months effective June 28, 2011.  The District Court dismissed 
the case on April 25, 2012.  Plaintiffs timely appealed.     
II.  Jurisdiction & Standard of Review 
 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2201 and § 1332.  We have 
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  Our review of an order granting a Rule 12(b)(6) 
dismissal is plenary. Taliaferro v. Darby Twp. Zoning Bd., 458 F.3d 181, 188 (3d Cir. 
2006).  We must decide whether the complaint2
                                                                                                                                                             
attached to Defendants’ motion to dismiss. 
 contains “sufficient factual matter, 
accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 
556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).   
Although we must accept as true all of the complaint’s allegations and reasonable 
inferences drawn therefrom, we “need not credit a complaint’s bald assertions or legal 
conclusions when deciding a motion to dismiss.”  Morse v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 132 
F.3d 902, 906 (3d Cir. 1997). “[C]ourts have an obligation in matters before them to view 
the complaint as a whole and to base rulings not upon the presence of mere words but, 
rather, upon the presence of a factual situation which is or is not justiciable. We do draw 
on the allegations of the complaint, but in a realistic, rather than a slavish, manner.” Doug 
2 A court may also look to exhibits attached to the complaint, matters of public record, 
and records of which the court may take judicial notice. McTernan v. City of York, Penn., 
577 F.3d 521, 526 (3d Cir. 2009) (citing Lum v. Bank of Am., 361 F.3d 217, 221 n.3 (3d 
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Grant, Inc. v. Greate Bay Casino Corp., 232 F.3d 173, 184 (3d Cir. 2000) (quoting City 
of Pittsburgh v. West Penn Power Co., 147 F.3d 256, 263 n.13 (3d Cir. 1998)).   
III.  Analysis 
A. Claims Against Mr. Tanner and His Firm   
Under Pennsylvania decisional law, a quantum meruit cause of action does not lie 
against unrelated successor counsel.  See Mager v. Bultena, 797 A.2d 948, 955 (Pa. 
Super. Ct. 2002) (“[The initial] attorney . . . does not have a quantum meruit action 
against the attorney who ultimately settles the case.”) (quoting Fowkes v. Shoemaker, 661 
A.2d 877, 879 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1995)); see also In re LaBrum & Doak, LLP, 225 B.R. 93, 
105–06 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1998) (stating “Pennsylvania law is clear that a quantum meruit 
cause of action does not lie against an unrelated successor attorney”); Cherry v. Zucker, 
57 Pa. D. & C. 4th 33, 38 (Com. Pl. 2002), aff’d, 817 A.2d 1172 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2002) 
(stating that an action in quantum meruit cannot be maintained by a dismissed attorney 
against successor counsel) (citing Cherry v. Weiss, 118 Del. Co. 117 (2000), aff’d, 754 
A.2d 13 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2000), app. den., 2000 WL 987134 (Pa. 2000)).   
Plaintiffs’ argument to the contrary relies improperly on dicta from Johnson v. 
Stein, 385 A.2d 514 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1978), and a later case citing that dicta, Feingold v. 
Pucello, 654 A.2d 1093 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1995).  In Johnson, the Superior Court affirmed 
the dismissal of an attorney’s claim for an equitable charging lien on a former client’s 
recovery and suggested the possibility of pursuing an unjust enrichment action against 
                                                                                                                                                             
Cir. 2004)).  
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successor counsel.  Johnson, 385 A.2d at 515.  This suggestion was later repudiated.  See 
Styer v. Hugo, 619 A.2d 347, 351 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993) (“[T]he appellant [in Johnson] 
had never sought recovery on a theory of unjust enrichment at any point in either the trial 
court or on appeal.  The Johnson Court’s gratuitous speculation as to whether appellant 
might be able to pursue such a theory at a later time is pure dicta.”), aff’d, 637 A.2d 276 
(Pa. 1994); see also Fowkes, 661 A.2d at 880 (citing Johnson and explaining that any 
suggestion of quantum meruit recovery against successor counsel was “pure dicta”).  
Furthermore, both Johnson and Feingold are factually distinct from the present case.  
Johnson involved a lawsuit between two attorneys who practiced in the same firm.   
Feingold involved a lawsuit between an attorney and former client.   Neither involved a 
lawsuit between the initial attorney and unrelated successor counsel.  Plaintiffs fail to 
identify a single Pennsylvania case that supports their quantum meruit claim against Mr. 
Tanner and his firm.  
B. Claims Against the Allens 
No Pennsylvania court has addressed whether a suspended or disbarred attorney is 
entitled to recover from a former client, in quantum meruit, the value of legal services 
rendered pursuant to a contingency-fee contract prior to the attorney’s suspension or 
disbarment.3
                                                 
3 Plaintiffs contend that framing the case’s central issue in this manner relies on improper 
speculation because the complaint alleges that the Allens’ case was “transferred” to 
another attorney and there is no mention of Plaintiffs’ disciplinary histories.  This is a 
frivolous contention.  Although a court must assume the truth of a plaintiff’s factual 
  Courts in other jurisdictions addressing this issue have employed one of two 
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approaches.  Under the first approach, an attorney’s suspension or disbarment is treated as 
a voluntary withdrawal or abandonment, amounting to a material breach of the parties’ 
contract and precluding recovery under the contract or on a quantum meruit theory.  See 
Fletcher v. Krise, 120 F.2d 809 (D.C. Cir. 1941); In re Woodworth, 15 F. Supp. 291 
(S.D.N.Y. 1936); Royden v. Ardoin, 331 S.W.2d 206 (Tex. 1960); Sympson v. Rogers, 
314 S.W.2d 717 (Mo. 1958); Davenport v. Waggoner, 207 N.W. 972 (S.D. 1926).  Under 
the second approach, an attorney’s suspension or disbarment is seen not as voluntary 
abandonment, but, rather, as an automatic termination of the attorney-client relationship 
by operation of law, akin to incapacitation from illness or death, which, under the theory 
of impossibility, or frustration of contractual purpose, excuses nonperformance and 
allows recovery for partial performance.  See, e.g., Cooper v. Texaco, Inc., 961 F.2d 71 
(5th Cir. 1992); Eisenberg v. Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp., 761 F. Supp. 20 (E.D. Pa. 
1991); West v. Jayne, 484 N.W.2d 186 (Iowa 1992); Stein v. Shaw, 79 A.2d 310 (N.J. 
1951); Rutenbeck v. Grossenbach, 867 P.2d 36 (Colo. App. 1993); Delbecarro v. 
Cirignani, 633 N.E.2d 981 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994); Padilla v. Sansivieri, 815 N.Y.S.2d 173 
(N.Y. App. Div. 2006).  Recovery is disallowed under the second approach, however, if 
                                                                                                                                                             
allegations on a motion to dismiss, it is not required to accept as true unsupported 
conclusions or unwarranted inferences.  See Doug Grant, 232 F.3d at 183–84 (3d Cir. 
2000). The District Court was not required to ignore the public disciplinary records which 
clearly demonstrate that Mr. Feingold was suspended from the practice of law in 
Pennsylvania on March 30, 2006, and Mr. Pearson, on May 28, 2009. The Court’s 
framing of the issue, therefore, was not based on assumptions or speculation, but on the 
fact that, as a result of their suspensions, Mssrs. Pearson and Feingold could no longer 
represent the Allens.    
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the misconduct leading to disciplinary action is not wholly unrelated to the representation 
for which compensation is sought.   
The District Court adopted the first approach.  We need not, however, decide 
which is the better of the two approaches, much less endorse one over the other, because 
under either one, Plaintiffs’ claims fail.  Under the first approach, the disciplinary actions 
taken against Plaintiffs constituted a material breach of their respective contracts with the 
Allens, barring any and all recovery.  Under the second approach, Plaintiffs cannot 
recover because the public disciplinary documents4
                                                 
4  The District Court was suitably taken aback by the “glaring absence” of Plaintiffs’ 
disciplinary histories from their complaint.  In 2006, Mr. Feingold was suspended from 
the practice of law in Pennsylvania for five years for, inter alia, “filing frivolous claims 
of fraud and civil conspiracy against opposing counsel.” Feingold v. Hendrzak, 15 A.3d 
937, 939 n.1 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2011).  He was disbarred on August 22, 2008, because he 
“failed to notify his clients of [the earlier] disciplinary action and continued practicing 
law while suspended.” Id.; see also Feingold v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 415 F. 
App’x 429, 430 (3d Cir. 2011). Mr. Pearson was suspended for actively assisting Mr. 
Feingold in the unauthorized practice of law.  Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Pearson, 
No. 1410 Disciplinary Docket No. 3 (Pa. 2011).    
 strongly suggest that the wrongful 
conduct leading to Mr. Feingold’s suspension and ultimate disbarment and Mr. Pearson’s 
suspension was related to their representation of the Allens.  Mr. Feingold was disbarred 
for continuing to engage in law-related activities after his suspension in 2006.  According 
to the complaint, he did not transfer the Allen case to Mr. Pearson until 2007.  Mr. 
Pearson was suspended for actively assisting Mr. Feingold, a suspended and later 
disbarred attorney, in the unlawful practice of law from late 2007 until May 2009.  This 
time period coincides with Mr. Pearson’s representation of the Allens.  
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IV.  Conclusion 
 We will affirm the order of the District Court.    
 
 
